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AN ECONOMIST LOOKS AT SOLAH ENERGY:

THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE

Elliot J. Roseman
Economic Analyst
y. S. Department of Energy
Conservation and Solar Applications
Washington, D.C.

his own gain. And he is in this led by
an invisible hand to promote an end which
was no part of his intention. By pursuing
his own interest he frequently promotes
that of society more effectually than
when he really intends to promote it.

ABSTRACT

The economist speaks in terms of free enterprise,
and of competition* This most pure state of ec
onomic existence, where all economic textbooks
begin, is a rare occurrence in the real world,
however. The energy market is a notable example
of how government involvement has skewed consumer
chpices. This is as it should be, for we expect
the public decision ^-making process to involve
more than just considerations of economy.

Macro-economics, however, uses the model of per
fect competition only to depart from it. Free
enterprise is a reference point to be departed
from in seeking to illuminate some portion of the
real economic world, where externalities com
monly operate.

This paper will place solar energy in the context
of a marketplace for energy, and justify the role
of government in influencing solar energy market
development and market penetration. It will also
examine the concept of commercialization, the
effect of government incentives, and the proper
timing of government involvement.

The government long ago decided to involve itself
ir^ the marketplace for energy. Notable examples
of this include the regulation of utilities and
the dissolution of the Standard Oil monopoly. For
better or for worse, it has been a function of
government since that time to skew consumer choices
for energy. Certain energy sources have been
subsidized or otherwise encouraged, and others
have been restricted or discouraged. Government
involvement in energy in some form is a foregone
conclusion, particularly in these times of disturbing
energy shortages, strong environmental and social
concerns, and potential embargoes. Only the proper
nature and level of involvement is at issue.
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BACKGROUND - THE FREE MARKET - FACT OR FICTION?

It is hypothesized that federal incentives for
energy production result from economic, political,
and legal pressures to rectify perceived market
failures. When price signals from the marketplace
do not coincide with the goals and objectives of
industry, consumer groups, or public institutions,
the perception is one of market failure. Using
perceived market failure as justification, industry
allocates resources to affect energy policy in
order to gain greater profits. Consumer groups
seek lower prices. Research scientists and ad
ministrators of public institutions also affect
energy policy.

The economist speaks in terms of free enterprise,
and of competition. In the absence of market ex
ternalities, such as government involvement1 and
natural monopolies, the marketplace will operate
of its own momentum so as to perfectly answer the
questions: What shall be produced? How shall it
be produced? and For Whom shall it be produced? 2
Suppliers meet demanders in the marketplace and
conduct "arms-length" transactions that optimally
determine the resource utilization, prices, distri
bution, manufacture and wages (the list is far
from exhaustive) of all goods and services avail
able to consumers at a point in time. In theory,
the marketplace is a massively complex and ideally
oiled machine where private decisions are in sum
equivalent to public good. As another economic
theorist has offered:
- Every individual endeavors to employ his
capital so that its produce may be of
greatest value. He generally neither
intends to promote the public interest,
nor knows how much he is promoting it.
He intends only his own security, only

If all the incentives to increase energy produc
tion were attributed to structural deficiencies of
the industries or to externalities of the proces
ses, an analysis of incentives could be approach
ed totally within an economic framework. If, on
the other hand, incentives are the result of per
ceived market failure, alternative frameworks
would result in a greater utilization of federal
incentives to energy production.
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economic welfare" is another term for expressing
How does solar energy fit into
this concept.
this context?

Consider curve S presented in Figure I as a
secular supply curve for U.S. energy. The curve
is secular because it represents all of the energy
that exists in known forms over time. It repre
sents the range of energy quantitites that would
be marketed at various prices in the absence of
government incentives. The shape of the curve is
primarily determined by the existence and loca
tion of known energy resources and the rate at
which a stream of technology can be utilized to
transform the.se resources into power. As more
of the energy resources are used, the supply be
comes more inelastic. This is so because it costs
more to dig or drill deeper or to utilize lower
grade resources.

II.

SOLAR ENERGY - IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST?

As one of the energy options available to con
sumers, businessmen, and policy makers alike,
solar energy for heating and cooling of build
ings (SHAG) is a prime candidate for government
incentives to encourage its greater utilization.
Among other advantages, it offers 1) the
opportunity to reduce the use of nuclear and
fossil fuels, 2) a net reduction of pollution
over power produced by more conventional means,
3) a renewable alternative to finite fuel sources,
4) a decentralized versus centralized quality
affording greater citizen control than our pre
sent energy delivery system, and 5) the promise
of cost competitiveness in many areas of the
Clearly, economics is not the
country today.
whole story of solar energy.

The price of energy is established at the in
tersection of S Q and the demand curve for energy,
D . Changes in the demand and the resultant
effect on the price could be perceived as market
failure. The result could be pressure from in
dustry, consumers, or public institutions to
create incentives to increase energy production
at some historic price. These pressures can be
viewed from an economic, political, institutional,
or legal perspective.

However, most consumers will not incorporate the
full range of solar energy benefits into their
decision process. They will include first costs
and a limited range of other variables depending
on the application (residential, commercial, in
dustrial). In all applications, reasons 1-3 above
would likely be outside the consumer decision
process; it remains for government to correct for
this market failure.

Consider curve S/ as an apparent secular supply
curve for energy. Some of the real costs of
energy production are borne by the federal govern-^
ment through the creation and administration of
policies, programs, and projects. The effect of
these incentives is to increase the production
of energy at a lower price. The cause is the in-"
elusion of participants whose goals are other than
the sale and purchase of energy and who are not
relatively interchangeable with relatively equal
power. Participants who are less interchangeable
and whose power is less than buyers and sellers
operate in the political arena rather than in
the marketplace. Actions of participants who are
still less interchangeable and have less power
can be described from an institutional point of
view. The legal point of view can be used to
understand the resulting pressures by participants
with the least power and the least interchangeability.

In recent years, the working of our political
economy has spawned substantial solar legislation
at all levels of government. As the federal level
alone, these laws have encompassed and mandated
research and development, demonstration projects,
standards development, information dissemination,
and other activties broadly construed as com
The "feds"
mercialization (see section III).
are engaged in actively promoting a consumer tech
nology. How far should the government go?
In order to conceptualize the possible government
role in solar energy, it is useful to describe
the solar marketplace as a "technology delivery
system" (TDS). By this is meant a model of all
the potential influencers of solar market status
from scientists to manufacturers to final con
sumers. Figure 2 depicts such a model.

Therefore, whereas it is entirely fitting to ask,
"Could not energy be delivered to end users more
expeditiously and economically in the absence of
government interference?", this purist argument
fails on two major counts:

The TDS is the context into which all government
policies affecting solar energy must fit. It is a
complex environment that lends itself to incen
tives of both an economic and non-quantifiable
nature. Examples of the former include tax
credits, (property, sales, income) low interest
loans and grants, while the latter ecompasses
standards, consumer information and protection,
and building codes, all of which set the "rules of
the game." Whatever incentive is chosen, the
question to answer is not only what incentive is
appropriate, but also what level of incentive is
advisable, and what TDS member(s) should be sti
mulated if greater use of solar energy is the
objective? Incentives could be devised for every

1) The reality of our economic history is
already heavily weighted in the opposite direction,
and
2) There are considerations other than economy
that must receive attention (i.e. unemployment,
pollution, quality of life), and government is
the only entity in our society fully responsible
for addressing them and capable of integrating
both economic and non-economic influences into
policy decisions and legislation. Political ec
onomy is inclusive of the political, institutional,
and legal frameworks, and it is the concept of
importance in the marketplace for energy. "Net
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TDS member. 9 Appendix i and Table II n analyze onepotential incentive in depth.
Lastly, there is a danger that government involve
ment will become prolonged beyond its useful life.
Our tax system in particular is riddled with such
anachronisms. An additional question then is when
does the government get out of the business of
incentives and allow a return to normal market
forces. That is, can the government measure
when there is a self-sustaining solar industry so
it can cease at least its economic measures., 1^
The last section of this paper suggests a pos
sible measure to use as indicator of program
utility. When can SHAG systems be officially con
sidered "commercialized"?
III.

incentives to that TDS "member" are inappropriate .
End use incentives, though potentially shorter in
duration, are at the cutting edge of public policy,
are the most politically visible, and enter into
consideration just at the time when the SHAC market
is ready to expand vigorously or to fizzle.
Table 1 lists a range of possible end use economic
incentives .
Lastly, the choice of incentive will depend on
the climatological, alternative energy, financial,
legal, institutional and attitudinal environments
in which SHAC systems exist. Commercialization
at this level of specificity includes distinctly
regional, state, and local geographical areas and
organizations. For each subset of the TDS, incen
tives must be tailored to these environments.

COMMERCIALIZATION

In practice, the federal government has developed
consumer decision models that predict consumer
purchase reactions based on a set of economic
incentives in a given market environment (see
Appendix 1). Such tools must continue to be
refined as our understanding of energy behavior
grows. Again, economics is not the whole story.

Having accepted some measure of government involve
ment in SHAC, we are left with four fundamental
questions:
1) What incentives to use?
2) What level of incentive to use?

TABLE 1
END USE ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

3) What TDS member to "incentivize?"

Interest Subsidy
Tax Credit
Tax Deduction
Rapid Amortization
Property Tax Credit
Sales Tax Credit
Guaranteed Loan

4) When are solar systems commercialized?
Only by being able to satisfactorily answer these
questions can the government devise coherent
programs that help create the conditions in which
a private market for SHAC systems can grow and
flourish.

Grants
Insurance and Reinsurance
Equity Investments
Utility Incentives
Tax on Alternative Fuels
Government Procurement

Source: Analysis of Policy Options for Accelerat
ing Commercialization of Solar Heating and Cooling
Systems, Bezdek, Roseraan, et al, Behavioral Studies
Group, The George Washington University, Washington,
D.C., April 1977, pp 102 and 108.

For the purpose of this paper f "Commercialization"
is defined as the entire range of possible govern
ment activities in support of the development of
a viable solar marketplace. This definition
includes demonstration projects, research and
development, standards development, tax credits,
and all programs that have as their objective
the hastening of SHAC systems to the marketplace.
All TDS members are potential targets of government
commercialization efforts.

These models go to the heart of the government's
dilemma in constructing an effective commercializa
tion package. What incentives will have what
impact? What magnitude of incentive will "do the
trick"? The model used in appendix 1 based its
predictions on life cycle costs, annual savings,
and first costs, but it is only informed speculation,
that allows us to pick out these few key criteria
while the others recede into the periphery.
Careful survey, analysis, and actual market experi
ence of TDS members allow model builders to con
tribute to the design of accurate models and
responsible policies.

It is not only important that commercialization
activities be properly selected, but also that
they be properly phased. For example, it would
be inappropriate to grant low interest loans to
a technical concept that was still on the drawing
board. In theory, commercialization activities
will flow on a continuum from left to right on
Figure 2, but in practice, many programs will
proceed concurrently.

Two incentive philosophies that emerge from this
debate include "demand-pull" and "supply push."
The former involves lowering the relative cost or
risk of solar systems to end users, and the latter
involves the lowering of cost or risk to inter
mediate TDS members. 2 The first accelerates
consumer desire for the technology, the second
makes that technology more available. The
mechanisms in table 1 are all demand-pull incentives;
a demonstration program would be an example of
supply push. The decision model will predict which
philosophical strategy, or mix of strategies, will

Some commercialization activities are more critical
at one time than at another. Clearly, the choice
between provisions for SHAC grants, tax subsidies,
low interest loans, accelerated depreciation and
the like becomes academic if the hardware is
unrealiable or unavailable. It is only when
the seed of a marketplace exists that "end use"
(final consumer) incentives become salient, whereas
manufacturing incentives may continue for the
lifetime of government commerqialization activities.
If a cell in Figure 2 is empty (a null set),
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This is a diffcult mark to hit precisely. In
practice, incentives can be designed to continue
until one is certain that the inflection point has
been passed. Then, the government can pull out,
knowing that SHAC systems can now compete on their
own merits.

generate the most market penetration for each
government dollar invested.
However, model predictions are devoid of meaning
in a situation where clearly perceived and accepted
goals have not been set. Only when the evaluation
criteria are agreed upon can the model's numbers
assume any qualitative value. Is 2.5 million solar
homes enough by 1985? Are we trying to install
solar collectors or save energy? How many barrels
of oil do we wish to displace in year X? Only
within the context of goals do a model's predic
tions take on meaning. Success can only be
measured if the yardstick for measuring it is
accepted beforehand by government policy makers.

Other goals such as equalizing first costs with
competing systems would use other measures to
determine a program's effectiveness. Whatever the
goal, policy decisions must only be made in the
context of detailed knowledge of the TDS and
its members likely reaction to cost, risk, and
other environmental elements.
APPENDIX I*

The first three questions posed at the outset of
this section have been implicitly answered in the
foregoing discussion of models and goals, and may
be summed up in the phrase "divide and calibrate."
After selecting the objective(s) divide the
market into its components (TDS members) and
calibrate their responses to given levels of given
incentives in given environments. Aggregate
these to the local, regional, or national level
as appropriate, and compare to the original
evaluation criteria.

INTRODUCTION

Much debate has recently occurred in the U. S.
concerning the proper type and level of economic
incentives to encourage the use of solar energy.
Prior to the National Energy Plan (NEP) tax credits
for homeowners, investment tax credits for busi
nesses, low interest loans and guaranteed loans
and a range of other possible incentives were dis
cussed to encourage the use of solar energy. Pres
ident Carter's NEP, however, has narrowed this
debate focusing on the homeowner tax credit as the
major device for promoting the use of solar energy.
This example provides an analysis of the following
incentive option:

How does one know when SHAC systems are commercial
ized? The following measure is herein proposed:
Suppose the government goal is to equalize the
life cycle costs of competing systems. Use the
traditional logit model of market penetration and
closely monitor systems costs and market sales
(Figure 3) to pinpoint when the curves inflection
point is or will be reached or slightly passed.
This is the second triangle in Figure 3. Consis
tent with our objective, positive government
incentives should be winding down, by this point,
possibly leaving only regulatory and consumer
protection programs in place to control abuses.

Incentive I:

See Table II

Purchaser Tax Credit of 30% on the
First $1,500 of System Cost, 20% on
Next $8,500, up to a Maximum of
$2,150 Tax Credit, Effective 19771984.

for market penetration results.

METHODOLOGY

A modified version of the MITRE/METREK Solar
Heating and Cooling Market Penetration Model was
utilized. This model disaggregates the U. S. into
16 climatic regions. In this analysis, simulations
were run for the seven of the 16 regions containing
approximately 70% of the existing and the antici
pated new buildings through 1985. The results were
then scaled accordingly to derive comprehensive
national estimates. The nine building types con
tained in the model were aggregated here to two
types: residential and commercial. It was assumed
that inflation would proceed at an annual rate of
5%, that fuel prices would increase at an annual
rate of 7%, and that no incremental property taxes
would be assessed on the SHAC systems.

This measure has the aesthetic and numerical appeal
of occuring approximately at the point that life
cycle costs for the conventional energy system
with and without SHAC systems are equivalent.
As has been pointed out, the government has a long
history of involvement in the delivery of energy
to end users. In so doing, the initial and oper
ating cost of the conventional systems have been
effectively lowered. The inflection point in
figure 3 represents that point at which SHAC
systems have attained par lifetime value with
fossil and nuclear energy delivery techniques.
Incentives continued beyond this point tend to
supplant private mechanisms and capital that are
drawn out as soon as full lifetime competitiveness
is achieved.

System costs varied by building type (residential,
commercial), by system type, and by region. The
following average costs were used. Residential
water heating systems in 1977 cost $17.40 per
square foot, plus a fixed cost of $397. Residen
tial combined water and space heating systems cost
$29.31 per square foot plus a fixed cost which is
region dependent. Commercial water and space
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\
In this analysis, the price of conventional and
solar are calculated on a life-cycle basis, using
a discount rate of 9%. Since the logit model has
two parameters, two data points are needed to fit
The first point is taken from 1976
the curves.
estimated 1.9% market penetration by solar - 5000
solar systems installed on a target housing population of 30,000, our estimate of the number of resi
dential and commercial structures built in 1976 that
were (a) all electric; (b) oriented to the sun,
plus the retrofit target population, which were
(a) all electric; (b) oriented to the sun, and (c)
had more than 20 years useful life remaining. The
second point on the surve is based upon an estimate
that solar hot water heating will achieve 50% market
penetration when it has a four-fold life cycle cost
advantage over conventional systems. This is a
conservative assumption, since one might expect
50% market penetration when the two prices are
approximately equal. Our choice of the much more
conservative number is based upon the uncertainty
associated with future solar maintenance and
operating costs.

heating systems in 1977 cost $22,61 per square foot
plus a fixed cost of $13,615. Commercial water and
space heating systems cost $27.64 per square foot
plus a fixed cost that is region dependent. A
moderate "learning curve" effect was incorporated
into the analysis which gradually reduced system
costs as total production increased.
In this analysis, the total costs for a solar hot
water and a solar heating and hot watej: system have
been divided into two categories: Those that will
be subject to cost decreases due to experience,
and those which will not decrease. System costs
.that are subject to experience include the col3.ector and its hardware, control systems, and some
design, installation, and markup charges. Those
costs not subject to experience include pumps/ heat
exchangers, plumbing material, auxiliary units,
tanks, etc. The experience relateci costs represent
approximately 25% of the total system costs.
For each region in each year, life cycle cost
ratios (LCR) are computed. This is the ratio of
the life cycle cost of the solar system to the life
cycle cost of the qonventional (electric) system
and it is the driving parameter of the model. Sep
arate ratios are computed for residential water
heating systems, residential water and space heat*ing systems, commercial water heating systems, and
commercial water and space heating systems. The
new construction market is considered separately
from the retrofit construction market. For each
system type, the potential new construction market
is the number of new buildings constructed sqaled
by an adjustment factor. The retrofit construc
tion market is the existing number of electric
systems, adjusted by a suitability factor.

*This example of the use of a model based upon
economic decision criteria has been taken from
"Costs and Impacts of Financial Incentives for
Solar Energy Systems" by Dr. Roger H. Bezdek and
Elliot J. Roseman presented at the International

Solar Energy Society (ISES) conference held in
— New Delhi, India, January 16-21, 1978.
Some would say government "intervention" or
"intrusion", thus begging the question of its
propriety.
Paul A. Samuelson, Economics, 9th edition, McGraw
Hill Book Company, New York, 1978, p.23
fbid, p, 41, Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations

MARKET SHARE COMPUTATION

In a soon-to-be-release report, Battelle North
west Laboratories documents the numerical incen
tives that government has provided to the fuels
commonly in use today-nuclear, coal, oil, natural
In each case, the
. gas, and hydroelectric power.
aggregate amount is in the billions of dollars.
This capital has supplemented private capital to
create new energy realities. For example, the
commercial nuclear industry would not be where
it is today without the active weapons program
of the 1940's and 50's, nor would the oil in
dustry have reached its current magnitude without
the depletion allowance. Some incentives, such
as the Price-Anderson Act, (limiting nuclear
plant liability in the event of accidents) are nonquantifiable but tangible. See An Analysis of _
Federal Incentives Used to Stimulate Energy
Production, Battelle Pacific Northwest Labo^
ratories, September, 1977
4
"Commercialization" is the term currently employed
to describe the range of activities that govern
ment at all levels can undertake to bring about
a market reality. Section III expands on this
concept.

Once the model produces estimates of the life cycle
costs for conventional and solar installations,
there remains the task of converting the two cost
estimates into market penetration estimates for
solar energy. Following a long line of researchers,
we shall adopt the logit model developed by
MacFadden, and first applied in the fuel choice
literature by Jaskow and Baughman. 1 The specific
mathematical form is due to Case.

ft!?1
Dg
D
C'.DS/DS+ DC
P
PC
«<,m

Where:

=
*
=
=
=
=

solar sales
conventional sales
solar market penetration)
price of solar
price of conventional
parameters

Samuelson, p. 4

3-5

See for example, An Analysis of the Current
Economic Feasibility of Solar Water and Space
Heating, U.S. Department of Energy, Division of
Solar Applications, January, 1978, DOE/CS-0023 .
To name a few, P.L. 93-473, "Solar Energy Research
Development and Demonstration Act of 1974"
P.L. 93-438,"Energy Reorganization Act of 1974"
P.L. 93-409, "Solar Heating and Cooling Demon
stration Act of 1974."
Also see, State Solar Legislation, published
by the National Solar Heating and Cooling Infor mation Center in Philadelphia.
This chart may be found in Solar Energy Incentives
Analysis: Psycho-Economic Factors Affecting the
Decision Making of Consumers and the Technology
Delivery System, U. S. Department of Energy,
Division of Solar Applications, January, 1978,
HCP/M2534/01, p.5

-federal and state building i solar authorities rates, availability
DOE>5t4l8hOM5ln9mhorU1es) .E!j£i
.^;-f^-

Figure 2

8.
A seminal article on the topic is by Dr. Arthur
Ezra, "Technology Utiliztion: Incentives and
Solar Energy", February 28, 1975,Science magazine.
9
Solar Energy Incentives Analysis, pp. 34-39

Market Share - Logit Specification

Philosophically, one can argue that the govern
ment can not do 'marketing" competently and that
it should stick solely to the area of preventing
abuses (i.e. minimum performance levels and anti
trust enforcement). This ignores, however, the
urgency of our energy situation — the government
must supplant private funds in order to shorten
the lead time on product development through
positive catalysts as well as protective measures.
For further elaboration, see Government Support
for the Commercialization of New Energy Technolo
gies, MIT Energy Laboratory Report No. MIT-EL
76-009 (ERDA Contract E(49-18 2295), November,
1976.

Market Pentration of Solar Heating and Cooling
Systems," Dr. Roger Bezdek and Dr. Arthur Ezra,
International Solar Energy Society World Conference
proceedings, Orlando, Florida, June 6-9, 1977, pi.

11 See Solar Energy Incentives Analysis (Reference
8) for an elaboration on the behavioral compo
nent of the energy marketplace

Figure 3

12'An indirect supply push would involve the perceiv
ed or actual raising of prices or risk for al
ternatives to solar (nuclear, oil, gas).
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